International law is routinely examined by legal scholars as if international law exists separately from economics, politics, and, most importantly, the class struggle. When discussing international law, scholars hesitate to ask difficult questions, such as why some secessionist-seeking movements succeed while others fail. An example is Heiko Krüger’s analysis of Nagorno-Karabakh, where Krüger refuses to examine the legality of Kosovo’s 2008 secession since he claims that it is a political and not a legal issue, as if politics and law can be so neatly compartmentalized. Asking such questions requires acknowledging that international law, like states, which draft, debate, and enforce international law, to paraphrase Engels, is not a power forced on the world from above but is a product of a particular stage of development and arises from irreconcilable antagonisms. International law mediates relations between states, which arose out of the class struggle “in order that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle,” as Engels wrote. Since states are a product of the class struggle and international law is a product of and serves to mediate relations between states, international law cannot be understood divorced from the conditions that gave rise to it and continue to influence it.
Milena Sterio’s “The Right to Self-Determination under International Law: ‘Selfistans,’ Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers” is one of the few books I have read that radically departs from mainstream legal scholarship. Sterio asks the difficult question: why do some secessionist-seeking movements succeed while others fail? Sterio argues that the primary factor determining whether a secessionist-seeking movement will succeed is if the so-called Great Powers (i.e., the US, UK, China, France, Russia, and potentially other countries like Japan, Germany, Italy, India, etc.) support it. Although not exactly novel, since any socialist familiar with US-led imperialism and secessionist movements would long ago have concluded the same, Steiro’s argument is a radical departure from mainstream scholarship on international law. Using various case studies such as East Timor, South Sudan, Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Chechnya, Sterio argues that the common factor in a secessionist movement’s success or failure is the support or lack thereof it receives from the ‘Great Powers,’ i.e., US-led Western imperialism, not international law.
Without a normative framework for assessing a people’s right to self-determination, it is difficult to determine if a secessionist-seeking people have a right to external self-determination under international law. A plausible argument could be made for the right to external self-determination in each case study examined. However, the support a secessionist-seeking people receive from US-led Western imperialism, not international law, ultimately determines the success or failure of the movement. This conclusion is based on comparing the legal arguments for secession with the actual outcome of the secessionist movement.
East Timor was a Portuguese colony before being forcibly annexed by Indonesia. Thus, East Timor had a solid legal case for colonial self-determination (from Portugal) within the decolonization paradigm or remedial secession (from Indonesia) due to rampant human rights abuses and the unwillingness of Indonesia to grant the East Timorese people meaningful internal self-determination. However, despite international law and Indonesia’s illegal annexation, East Timor remained occupied by Indonesia for more than 20 years with no chance of achieving independence. East Timor only succeeded in its independence struggle because of political changes following the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Indonesia was an essential geostrategic ally of US-led Western imperialism in its struggle against the Soviet Union and other progressive states. For decades, US-led Western imperialism supported the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. Australia even signed an economic treaty with Indonesia concerning the Timor Gap, legitimizing Indonesia’s claim over East Timor. So long as Indonesia was supported by US-led Western imperialism as a Cold War ally, the East Timorese liberation movement had no chance of success. Thus, US-led Western imperialism, not international law, determined the outcome of the East Timorese liberation movement.
South Sudan’s secession from Sudan in 2011 presents a more significant legal challenge for scholars. Firstly, the South Sudanese arguably don’t constitute a “people” under international law since there is little unifying the people of South Sudan, as demonstrated by the numerous civil wars and violent conflicts that have plagued South Sudan since independence. Secondly, determining which self-determination paradigm applies in the case of South Sudan is more challenging than one might expect. Although South Sudan was never a colony of Sudan, since South Sudan was administered separately from the North until the Juba Conference of 1947, some scholars argue that South Sudan should have achieved independence as a separate state from Sudan when the latter became independent in 1956. However, this argument ignores the principle of uti possidetis juris, which maintains that newly formed states retain the internal borders that their preceding dependent area had before their independence. Moreover, South Sudan achieved independence from Sudan, not Britain, meaning South Sudan’s secession more closely resembles a remedial secession than colonial self-determination. Determining South Sudan’s right to external self-determination hinges on whether the South Sudanese could meaningfully exercise internal self-determination within Sudan. Considering the Bashir regime’s authoritarianism and the history of violent conflict in Sudan, it would seem unlikely that South Sudan would be granted meaningful internal self-determination, but this remains speculative. Thirdly, South Sudan fails to satisfy the requirements of statehood as outlined in the 1933 Montevideo Convention. Famine, civil war, and state failure have characterized South Sudan’s independence. However, despite the weakness of the South Sudanese case for external self-determination, South Sudan achieved international recognition as an independent state. International law cannot explain South Sudan’s successful secession from Sudan since, as described above, the South Sudanese arguably don’t have a right to external self-determination, South Sudan’s secession doesn’t fall under the colonial paradigm or remedial secession, and state failure has characterized South Sudan since independence. Instead, South Sudan’s success can only be explained by the support South Sudan’s secession received from US-led Western imperialism. South Sudan achieved independence because of US-led Western imperialism’s desire to weaken Sudan. For decades, the South Sudanese waged a violent struggle for independence with little chance of success. Like East Timor, what decided the success or failure of the South Sudanese independence movement was the position of US-led Western imperialism towards the mother state, Sudan. After 9/11, the Bashir regime in Sudan, which had earlier provided refuge to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, became a target in the US-led War on Terror, and US-led Western imperialism sought to weaken Sudan. South Sudan, which contains most of Sudan’s oil wealth, succeeded in becoming independent not because it had a right to under international law, which is debatable, but because US-led Western imperialism supported South Sudan’s secession to divide and weaken Sudan. Thus, US-led Western imperialism, not international law, determined the outcome of the South Sudanese secessionist movement.
No case study examined offers more vigorous evidence than Kosovo that international law is not the main factor in determining the success or failure of a secessionist-seeking people. In 2008, when Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, Kosovo had no right to external self-determination under international law. Since Kosovo was not a colony of Serbia, Kosovo had no right to external self-determination within the decolonization paradigm. As for remedial secession, Serbia was willing to grant meaningful internal self-determination to Kosovo, which already enjoyed substantial autonomy, as a pre-condition of closer relations with the US and Europe; thus, Kosovo had no right to remedial secession. Moreover, Kosovo fails to meet the criteria of statehood as outlined in the 1993 Montevideo Convention since Kosovo is neither economically nor politically viable as a state. Therefore, international law cannot explain Kosovo’s success, especially since Kosovo had a stronger argument for external self-determination when it first declared independence in 1990 than in 2008. Instead, Kosovo’s secession served the interests of US-led Western imperialism, which has been heavily involved in Kosovo since NATO’s illegal air war against Serbia in 1999. Kosovo exists as a US protectorate in the geostrategic Balkans. As Diana Johnstone described it, Kosovo’s secession from Serbia was a “shameless land grab by the United States” and its NATO allies “to install an enormous military base (Camp Bondsteel) on other people’s strategically located land.” Thus, US-led Western imperialism, not international law, determined the outcome of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia.
When examining their right to external self-determination, Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia share similar attributes. The Chechens, Abkhaz, and South Ossetians are “people” under international law who have arguably been denied their right to internal self-determination by their mother states, Russia and Georgia. Moreover, despite limited international recognition, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have all the attributes of statehood, unlike Kosovo and, to some extent, South Sudan. However, neither Chechnya, Abkhazia, nor South Ossetia have achieved the same success as East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan, not because of international law, since all three have a stronger case for remedial secession than Kosovo and South Sudan, but because their secession doesn’t serve the interests of US-led Western imperialism. Unlike East Timor (post-Cold War), Kosovo, and South Sudan, US-led Western imperialism supports the mother states, Russia and Georgia. In the case of Chechnya, US-led Western imperialism supported Russia in its wars against the Chechen separatists (1994-1996, 1999-2000) since Russia itself is a ‘Great Power’ and because US-led Western imperialism wanted to strengthen Russia’s new capitalist rulers. In the case of Georgia, a prospective NATO member, US-led Western imperialism opposes the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to strengthen Georgia as a bastion of US influence in the geostrategic Caucasus region. Thus, US-led Western imperialism, not international law, especially since 2008, has determined the outcome of the secession of Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.
In all these case studies, the interests of US-led Western imperialism, or what Sterio calls the ‘rule of the Great Powers,’ have been the primary determining factor in the success or failure of a secessionist movement, not international law.
In studying the right of peoples to self-determination, Sterio’s theory of the ‘rule of the Great Powers,’ while not necessarily novel, was a refreshing perspective on a complex but important subject of international law.
T. J. Petrowski 